The wave-particle duality is a mind-boggling concept in quantum mechanics. The fact that a quantum object can sometimes exhibit wave or particle character makes little sense in a world that dislikes ambiguity and loves definite outcomes. As Einstein said,
“It seems as though we must use sometimes the one theory and sometimes the other, while at times we may use either. We are faced with a new kind of difficulty. We have two contradictory pictures of reality; separately, neither of them fully explains the phenomena of light, but together they do.”
Quantum physics shows us that not everything is deterministic; God does play dice.
In philosophy, we know many theories that differentiate right from wrong, drawing a line between “What Is” and “What Is Not.”
When we talk about the metaphysical question of ultimate reality, Buddhists claim that only the transient events are real, while the Vedāntins believe in the formless Brahman above everything else. Who is correct? Both and none says Jainism - an ancient religion and philosophy from the Indian subcontinent.
The Jains believe that we cannot understand reality from a single perspective. Both the Buddhists and Vedantins are true from process and permanence perspectives, respectively. But both are incorrect when they claim their theories to describe the ultimate truth.
The absolute reality with its multiple perspectives is only visible to Arihants, a spiritual teacher who has attained omniscience (Kevala jñāna, केवलज्ञान) by conquering the passions.
Normal individuals, however, are limited by their environment and experience. Hence, it’s important to consider diverse perspectives as each one of them gives a partial truth about reality.
This doctrine of "not-one-side" or "many-sidedness,” known as Anekāntavāda (अनेकान्तवाद), is even more relevant in today’s age of rigid opinions, fake news, and intolerance. What we believe as truth is often a single point of view conditioned by our biases and blinded by emotions. The pluralistic relativism of Anekantavada tells us not to confuse an outlook with omniscience. A belief can be valid from a certain standpoint but fallacious when taken as a universal truth. There can be numerous standpoints resulting in different judgments. The Jain philosophers explain them in detail with their two metaphysical-logical tools - Nayavāda and Syādvāda.
Nayavāda (नयवाद)
Nayavada is the theory of perspectives or standpoints (Naya, नय). The eighth-century Jain philosopher, Digambara Akalanka, defines Naya as “only a view of the knower.”
Bimal Matilal further clarifies the concept of Naya:
Each viewer views a thing from a particular standpoint. Thus, the nature of the thing that is revealed is necessarily conditioned or colored by a particular point of view. This amounts to saying that only a partial aspect of reality is revealed to the viewer.
While there can be infinite standpoints, the Jain philosophers identify seven Nayas based on the ontological and linguistic ideas of different schools of Indian philosophy. The first three investigate the thing itself, while the last four investigate the modifications that the thing undergoes in time and with linguistic expressions.
The Naigama (नैगम) standpoint, meaning “non-distinguishing,” comprehends a thing without distinguishing its generic and specific qualities. This is abstraction at the highest level. For example, a “dwelling” is a place where someone lives. From a Naigama standpoint, we will not consider different dwellings like a house, apartment, boat, or even a cave, for that matter. Somebody with the Naigama outlook will catalog everything under “dwelling.”
John Koller describes it as a standpoint that takes the being of something to be more fundamental than its becoming and thus does not differentiate among its various qualities and modes.1
The Jains believe that the Nyāya-Vaisesikha school has this standpoint with its metaphysical idea of a Substance (dravya). For the Naiyāyikas, a Substance is something over and above the qualities. The Jains do not deny this point of view but believe that it’s only a partial view of reality.
The Sangraha (संग्रह) standpoint, meaning “collection,” emphasizes the common features or general characteristics of things. We do not consider specific properties here. We can step down from the abstraction of “dwelling” to consider a house as a residential unit. No distinctions exist between a big or a small house, a nightmare for the real-estate industry but a utopian dream for class equality.
The Jains believe that Advaita Vedānta has this standpoint with its concept of Brahman as the one and only reality.
Complementary to the sangraha standpoint is Vyavahāra (व्यवहार) with its practical point of view. It describes the specific characteristics of a thing and shows how it is distinct from other things in the same category.
Our house will now have a description with this standpoint — a beautiful three-story home with an open kitchen and a large backyard. Much to the delight of real estate agents, the vyavahara standpoint is practical in nature and specific in description. Philosophically speaking, Vyavahāra considers both the essential and accidental proprieties of an object with more focus on the specifics. The Cārvākas, with their materialism, have a Vyavahāra outlook.
The Rjusūtra (ऋजुसूत्र) standpoint, literally meaning a “straight thread,” considers the momentary state of a thing — the immediate “here-and-now.”
For example, we now go inside the house and view its current condition - it can be messy with toys and utensils all over the place. But at a different moment, it can be clean and systematic.The Jains believe that Buddhists have a Rjusūtra point of view with their theory of momentariness.
The Sabda (शब्द) Naya is a linguistic (verbal) standpoint where we take synonymous words in the same sense; for instance, apis, bee, and drone are different expressions for the honeybee. The Sabda Naya does not concern itself with the difference of synonymous words but considers them as equivalents.2
The Sambhirudha (समभिरूढ़) Naya makes a subtle distinction between synonymous utterances but with different meanings; variations in words with different etymologies. In India, there are varieties of names for the same God to highlight the different characteristics. For example, Krishna is known as Gopala (गोपाल), the protector of cows, and also as Murari, the killer of the asura named Mura.
While Sabda Naya will treat synonyms as equivalent words, the Sambirudha Naya will distinguish them from one another on etymological grounds.3
The Evambhuta (एवम्भूत), meaning “thus-happened,” is another linguistic standpoint in which words have contextual meaning based on a function exhibited during a particular event. For example, you can use the word “boxer” only when the person is boxing in the ring and not otherwise.
It’s amazing how abstractions capture the essence of different ideas. In mathematics, category theory is a conceptual framework that tells us how different mathematical structures are interrelated. With the same spirit but in a different way, Nayavāda also utilizes abstractions to identify standpoints in the thicket of metaphysical theories. But that’s not the end of the road.
The Jain philosophers, with their plural relativism, go even further to logically establish Anekāntavāda with their theory of Syādvāda.
Syādvāda (स्यादवाद)
We achieve a synthesis of different Nayas with the logical doctrine of conditional predication (Syādvāda).
In philosophy, predication expresses the relation between a thing and its attributes. It is symbolized as Fa(a is F), where “a” stands for any object and F for any predicate. For example, the ball (a) is red (F).
The word “Syāt” translates to “maybe” or “could be.” But this literal translation is inaccurate as the Jains do not imply any uncertainty or skepticism with Syādvāda.
A better understanding is to consider “Syāt” as the qualifying clause “In a way” or “From a certain perspective.”
Taken together with the concept of predication, we get the logical statement - syāt, a is F — In a way, a is F — From a certain perspective, a is F.
Syādvāda considers a system of sevenfold predication, Saptabhaṅgī (सप्तभंगी), to describe an entity with respect to some predicate. Each predicate will only reveal partial truth about the entity.
We begin with the three primary predications of affirmation, denial, and inexpressibility.
The qualifier Syāt is the statement - From a certain perspective/In a certain sense.
Syāt, a is F (स्याद् अस्ति एव) (Affirmation)
Syāt, a is not F (स्याद् नास्ति एव) (Denial)
Syāt, a is inexpressible (स्याद् अवक्तव्य एव) (Inexpressibility)
A combination of these predicates gives us the remaining four formulas:
Syāt, a is F; Syāt, a is not F (स्याद् अस्ति नास्ति एव)
Syāt, a is F; Syāt, a is inexpressible (स्याद् अस्ति अवक्तव्य एव)
Syāt, a is F; Syāt, a is inexpressible (स्याद् नास्ति अवक्तव्य एव)
Syāt, a is F; Syāt, a is not F; Syāt, a is inexpressible (स्याद् अस्ति नास्ति अवक्तव्य एव)
An important point to note here is that these statements do not contradict each other. The expression a is F and a is not F is always taken from a different perspective.
Four factors determine these perspectives - substance, place, time, and mode. 4
For example, the substance of the pot is clay. It will exist in a certain location and time, having some form or shape (mode).
When we say that the pot exists and does not exist from a certain perspective, it means that then pot does exist in reference to its substance (clay) but does not exist with reference to some other substance (feather). It does exist in its own place but does not exist in another place - Outlines of Jain Philosophy
The Jain philosophers also explain the concept of affirmation and denial with the changes happening in an entity over a period of time. For example, a person can be six-foot-tall but will stoop as he/she gets old.
With respect to time, Devdutta is six-foot tall.
With respect to (another) time, Devdutta is not six-foot tall.
While predicating the substance of a material object, we imply that it has a particular color, occupies particular space and time coordinates, but we implicitly deny possessing a different substance, different color, and different space and time coordinates.
There are more logical ways to examine Syādvāda than what we have covered in this article. Contemporary philosophers have also done a Modal analysis of Syādvāda5. But that is beyond the scope of this article. What we need to learn is that the difference between “What Is” and “What Is Not” is a matter of perspective.
Our society, culture, and environment make the lens through which we see this world. But we need multiple lenses to understand the world in a better way. And while omniscience is too far-fetched a goal, we can strive to be better humans by respecting diverse opinions while believing that what we know is a point of view and not the entire view itself.
Syādvāda as the epistemological key to the Jaina middle way metaphysics of Anekāntavāda - John M. Koller (Philosophy of East & West Volume 50, Number 3 July 2000)
Outlines of Jain philosophy - Mohan Lal Mehta
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ibid.
Saptabhaṅgī - The Jain theory of sevenfold predication: A logical analysis - Pragati Jain ((Philosophy of East & West Volume 50, Number 3 July 2000))