A relatively unknown Bollywood movie called Aankon Dekhi tells the story of a man who only believes in what he sees - an extreme case of epistemic justification through a single sense-organ.
While we don’t have to be so radical, perception through sense organs is the most reliable way to know the world around us. In our last issue, we understood that perception is a valid means to knowledge in Nyāya epistemology. It’s gained through sense-object contact (इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष) that does not require any antecedent knowledge. But there are still some open questions:
What is the mechanism of sense-object contact?
How exactly do we gain knowledge through this contact?
It’s no surprise that the Nyāya school, known for its extensive analysis in epistemology and logic, also gave a detailed account of perception.
Mind, Matter, Metaphysics
An interesting characteristic of Nyāya’s philosophy of perception is the inclusion of psychological and metaphysical concepts in explaining the mechanism and categories of sense-object contact.
The external perception between the object and the senses becomes knowledge with the internal perception between the Mind (मानस) and the Self. The Mind is a non-physical (अभौतिक) inner sense, while the Self is consciousness. To be conscious of an object, the mind should attend to the senses. We can recall numerous occasions where we missed what somebody was speaking because we were lost in our thoughts. The sense was present, but the mind was absent.
As stated in the Nyāya Sutra:
युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्ति: “मनसोः लिङ्गम्” ।।१।१।१३।।
It is impossible to perceive two things simultaneously. Perception does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ with its object, but it also requires conjunction with the mind.
The Naiyāyikas go further to define six different kinds of sense-object contacts. This is where the epistemology of perception meets the ontology of objects, properties, and relations. Though it sounds intimidating, the core idea is just a successive abstraction of properties. Imagine the associated examples, and the concepts will become as clear as day. 🙂
We begin with the basic conjunction (संयोग /संयुक्त) between sense and the object. Example - You see a jar on the ground.
Any object has certain properties like its shape, color, size, etc. There’s an inseparable relation between the property and the object. Hence, in perception, we have conjunction (संयुक्त) between the sense and the property inherited (समवाय) in the object. (संयुक्त समवाय ). Example - The jar is red. The eyes notice the red color that is inherited in the jar.
But there can be many objects of red color. The quality of being red can be called “redness.” This is an example of a universal property. Similarly, the universal property of “colornes” is also inherited in the jar (it has a color and all objects have color). Hence, our sense perceives colorness or redness through the jar and its color (red). This sense-object contact is referred to as संयुक्त समवेत समवाय (Sanyukta - Samveta - Samvāya)
Let’s focus on another sense-organ. We hear sounds with our ears. The sound inheres as a quality in the sense itself. This inherence (समवाय) is the fourth kind of sense-object contact.
The universal “soundness” is a further abstraction of the “sound” itself. There is inherence (soundness) in that which inheres (sound). This is known as समवेत समवाय (Samveta - Samvāya) .
We can also perceive the absence or non-existence of an object. For example, you notice the absence of a jar on the ground. A Naiyāyika will say that the ground “possesses” the absence of the jar. The absence of the pot is taken as the qualifier (विशेषण/Visheshan) of the ground, and the ground as the qualificand (विशेष्य/Visheshya) of the absence. This relation between the qualifier and the qualificand is known as Visesanatā (विशेषणता). It is also called Visheshan-Visheshya-Bhav (विशेषणविशेष्यभाव). 1
The categorical distinction of sense-object contact is a testament to the depth and richness of Nyāya philosophy. But this was not enough for Naiyāyikas. With the singular objective of removing suffering through knowledge, they took their epistemological inquiry forward to define the modes of perception.
The modes of perception
We express our perceptual awareness with language. What we perceive gets a name, category, and description. The Naiyāyikas believe that whatever exists is knowable and nameable.
अस्तित्वं ज्ञानेत्वं अभिद्येत्वं
But does our perception begin with the linguistic distinction of objects?
The Naiyāyikas think that linguistic construction is secondary. They propose a two-tiered approach for perceptual judgment - Nirvikalpaka (निर्विकल्पक) and Savikalpaka (सविकल्पक). The word Vikalp (विकल्प) means differentiating thought, or in this context, it is the ability to distinguish with words. Hence, Nirvikalpaka refers to indeterminate (non-distinguishing) perception while Savikalpaka is determinate (distinguishing) perception.
According to Nyāya, Nirvikalpaka (निर्विकल्पक) is the first-tier of perception. It is an apprehension of an object as “something,” but without the linguistic distinction of name and category.
निर्विकल्पकः ज्ञातृज्ञानादिविकल्पभेद- लयापेक्षः
An exclusive concentration upon the one entity without distinct and separate consciousness of the knower, the known, and the knowing.
Nirvikalpaka is raw unverbalised experience. It is apprehension without any judgment or distinction. A child or a person with an intellectual disability can perceive many objects but will not have a verbal expression for them.
The determinate perception (Savikalpaka) follows the indeterminate perception. It is at this stage that we have verbal expressions for the object. With Savikalpaka cognition, we associate objects with names, categories, and universals.
The distinction between Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka can be roughly compared with Russell’s theory of knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.
To have knowledge by Acquaintance, according to Russell, occurs when the subject has immediate or unmediated awareness of some propositional truth. Knowledge by description, by contrast, is propositional knowledge that is inferential, mediated, or indirect.
Here’s a summary of what we have learned so far about perception as a means to knowledge. Explore the diagram in detail.
The depth in Nyāya’s account of perception is unmatched by any other school of Indian Philosophy. Several Nyāya scholars gave detailed commentaries to expand on the Nyāya Sūtra and defend their epistemology from the refutations by other schools. That said, we are yet to cover another aspect of perception given by Navya-Nyāya (the new Nyāya school). One might be wondering what else is unknown in this already detailed account of perception? Well, what remains is an understanding of things beyond the senses.
We briefly touched on universal properties in sense-object contact. But how do we know about universals?
How might we account for the mystical experience?
And ultimately, how do we know about God? We cannot perceive God through our senses, yet many believe in God. How is this possible?
In the next issue, we will understand that there’s more to perception than what meets the eye. 🙂